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Abstract
In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting
liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such
as Kyle’s model, of agents’ interplay in the financial markets, are aligned
with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data.
Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact
grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further,
implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given
a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can
be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such
learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical
approaches.
Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several rea-
sons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical
measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool
to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their
strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as sub-
optimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance.
More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across mar-
kets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-
encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and sys-
temic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.
Keywords: Market Impact, Liquidity, Order-Flow Imbalance, Machine Learning
Note: This copy of the research does not include the source code. Please contact
the author for reference to the source code at – Email: ana@symbiotica.ai
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1 Introduction
A security marketplace broadly refers to any venue where buyers and sellers
culminate to exchange resources, enabling prices to adapt to supply and demand
(Bouchaud et al., 2018). Trading can take place in several possible ways; via
broker-intermediated over-the-counter (OTC) deals, specialized broker-dealer net-
works, decentralised internal chat rooms where traders engage in bilateral trans-
actions, amongst others.
In traditional quote-driven markets, all trading is enabled by designated market
makers (MM or specialists liquidity providers) who quote their prices with corre-
sponding volumes (the quantity to be bought/ sold), whilst other participants –
market takers – submit their orders to either buy at quoted ask price or sell at
the bid price posted by the market maker. In this respect, market makers offer
indicative prices to the whole market. However, today, most modern markets op-
erate electronically across multiple venues, and center around a continuous-time
double-auction (where participants can simultaneously auction buy and sell orders)
mechanism, using a visible limit order book (LOB). The LOB mechanism allows
any participant to quote bid/ ask prices, and a transaction takes place whenever
a buyer and a seller agree on the price. The London, New York (NYSE), Swiss,
Tokyo Stock Exchanges, NASDAQ, Euronext, and other smaller markets operate
using some kind of LOB. These cover a range of liquid (traded in large volume)
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products including stocks, futures, and foreign exchange. Market participants in
such venues can see the proposed prices, submit their own offers and execute trades
by sending relevant messages to the LOB. Owing to technological developments,
traders across the globe can access information about LOBs state in real-time and
incorporate their observations when deciding on how to act. This transparency
combined with low-latency, high liquidity and low trading costs of electronic ex-
changes appeals to many individual and institutional traders (Hautsch and Huang,
2011).
The quality of a security market is often characterised by its liquidity. Never-
theless, the term is not simple to define accurately, with precise definitions only
existing in the context of particular models. Generally, liquidity is provided when
counterparties enter into a firm commitment to trade. This ultimately results in
an exchange of resources at a perceived free market fair price (market clearing, as
described by general equilibrium pricing). In this regard, the term captures the
usual economic concept of price elasticity – in a highly liquid market (where many
participants are willing to trade) a small shift in supply (respectively demand)
does not result in a large price change (Hasbrouck, 2007). Kyle (1985) more ade-
quately describes liquidity by identifying three key properties of a liquid market:
tightness – “the cost of turning around a position over a short period of time”,
depth – “the size of an order-flow innovation required to change the prices by a
given amount” or the available volume at the quoted price, and resilience – “the
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speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock”.
Despite these simplistic yet elusive definitions, in the marketplace, liquidity is a
complex variable with multiple unobservable facets, and often the main contrib-
utor to the non-stationarity of financial time series (amongst other variables, i.e.,
volatility). The difficulty in providing a more comprehensive definition of liquidity
is exacerbated by the fact that academia has traditionally preferred to look at the
world through the lens of a perfect, frictionless market with infinite liquidity at the
market price. Nonetheless, the qualities associated with the word are sufficiently
widely accepted and understood, making the term useful in practical discourse.
In particular, practitioners discern market liquidity from that of funding liquidity.
To capital market participants, liquidity generally refers to implicit or explicit
transaction costs (arising from limited market depth in the security), bid-ask spread
(i.e., quality spread – a difference in interest rates/ the difference in price at which
one can buy or sell an asset) and price impact (a change in market price that
follows a trade). This is colloquially referred to as market liquidity. Conversely,
risk managers are often concerned with funding liquidity. This pertains to the ease
at which a financial institution can raise funds/ capital to meet cash shortfalls
(Acharya, 2006).
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1.1 Background
1.1.1 Liquidity Providers: The Modern Market-Maker
As outlined above, prior to the widespread adoption of LOBs, liquidity provision
was traditionally designated to a small group of specialists. These specialists served
as the exclusive source of liquidity for an entire market. This mechanism worked
particularly well for quote-driven markets, granting these so-called MMs several
privileges in exchange for immediate quotation and clearing services (i.e., ensuring
settlement of transactions). To maintain efficiency under this market structure,
dealers/ MMs must maintain undesirably large inventories (long position – assets
that have been bought; short position – asset borrowed against a deposit known as
collateral), accumulated whilst providing liquidity. This is problematic for MMs
who typically aim to keep their net inventory as close to zero as possible, so as not
to bear the risk of the assets’ price declining (Bouchaud et al., 2018).
Alternatively, modern markets place no such restriction; in today’s electronic mar-
kets, all agents can act as MM by offering liquidity to other participants. This
emerging complexity of electronic trading venues has intrinsically blurred the line
between the usual distinction of liquidity provider (MM) and consumer. Nonethe-
less, to assist our discussion we adopt a more concrete distinction of the type of
participants, as outlined in the works of Cartea, Jaimungal and Penalva (2015)
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and Bouchaud et al. (2018):
1. Informed Traders – attributed to sophisticated traders who profit from
leveraging statistical information (i.e., private signal or prediction) about
the future price of an asset, which may not be fully reflected in the assets
spot price
2. Uninformed Traders – attributed to either unsophisticated traders with
no access to (or inability to correctly/ efficient process) information, or mar-
ket participants who are driven by economic fundamentals outside of the
exchange. These traders are often labelled noise traders as a large fraction
of their trades arise from portfolio management and risk-return trade-offs
that carry very little short-term price information
3. Market makers (MMs) – attributed to (provisionally) uninformed pro-
fessional traders who profit from facilitating the exchange of a particular
security and exploiting their skills in executing trades
Clearly, the notion of information fundamentally underpins our classification of
each agent and defines their ability to accurately forecast price changes (Bouchaud
et al., 2018). Considering the interactions and tensions amidst these groups pro-
vides useful insights into the origins of many interesting observed phenomena in
modern financial markets.
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1.1.2 Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
The rate at which information is incorporated/ reflected in prices underpins the
degree of efficiency in the market. In this regards, financial markets are not
generally classified purely at two extremes (efficient or inefficient) but have been
shown to exhibit various degrees of efficiency (McMillan et al., 2011). In this
view, market efficiency is observed as a continuum between extremes of completely
efficient, at one end, and inefficient at the other. This is consistent with widespread
empirical observations (see Finnerty (1976) and Seyhun (1986)), where the strong
form efficiency has been shown not to hold in light of private information.
As private information can consist of signals about the terminal value of the se-
curity, information asymmetry is of fundamental importance to MMs (who often
trade with highly informed participants) and is the prevailing consideration of our
study. Whereas most small trades contain relatively little information and are
thus innocuous for MMs providing liquidity; larger orders could be interpreted
as stronger signals of an information advantage stemming from better predictive
models.
An imperative consequence of such informed order-flows (trends in the direction
of trading arising from more informed participants) is the resulting inventory im-
balance, where MMs are forced to accumulate larger net positions in the short-run
– i.e., MM receives many more buy orders than sell, with a high probability of
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being on the wrong side of the trade. This is known as adverse selection and may
cause MMs huge losses as they are “picked-off” by more informed traders when
making binding quotes (Hasbrouck, 2007).
To compensate for this information asymmetry (therefore mitigating the risk of
being adversely selected), MMs choose how much liquidity to reveal and look to
efficiently process any new piece of information by updating their bid/ ask quotes
in response to the order-flow imbalance. Such market friction results in Mean
Field Games, where MMs adjusts their bid/ ask prices as more informed liquidity
takers submit large trades. This leads to a worse execution price for the informed
trader – the so-called market or price impact. Consequently, informed agents must
selectively take liquidity using optimal execution strategies (i.e., split their large
orders across time to match the liquidity volume revealed by MM) as described in
the work of Almgren and Chriss (2001), see Appendix B.1.
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1.2 Motivation
Following the wake of the 2007 global credit crisis, there has been a myriad of
regulations requiring institutional investors (both on the buy-side and sell-side) to
meet several liquidity related policies (see Table 1). This stems from the general
perceived reduction in the quality of liquidity across asset classes as per the report
produced by Bloomberg (2016).
Buy Side Sell Side
Prudent Valuation MIFID II
RRP SEC (22E-4)
ILAAP AIFMD
Basel 3 (LCR) UCITS
FRTB (Basel 4) FORM PF
Table 1: Financial Liquidity Regulations
Liquidity risk is of special importance to practitioners because it might cause a
bank to fail despite no trading losses (Murphy, 2008). This risk pertains to the
firms’ ability to meet cash demands. These demands might be either known in
advance, such as coupon payments; or unexpected, such as the early exercise of
options or the need to liquidate portfolios of large positions. Therefore, inadequate
funding and market liquidity may impair the firms’ ability to meet their payment
obligations.
Moreover, excess transaction costs arising from liquidity concerns are important
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factors in determining investment firms’ performance. These costs can become
very high, reducing any trading profits. According to Jean-Philippe Bouchaud
from Capital Fund Management, nearly two-thirds of trading profits can be lost
because of market impact costs (Day, 2017). Whilst explicit transaction costs
can be accounted for, the implicit costs (such as market impact) cannot be esti-
mated directly but can be approximated by measuring liquidity and minimized by
adopting an optimal trading strategy.
Within the microstructure of financial markets, an optimal liquidation/ acquisition
strategy delivers the minimum market impact for a particular order size and time
horizon (the urgency at which an asset is to be bought/ sold). In this respect,
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2018) define market impact as the expected adverse price
movement from a pre-trade benchmark (the decision/ fair price for which a trader
wishes to purchase an asset), upon execution. Consequently, accurate measure-
ment of market impact is essential, possibly blurring the line between a profitable
and unprofitable strategy net of such transaction costs.
However, the effect of a firm’s own trading activity on the market prices is notori-
ously difficult to model as there is no standard formula that applies to every finan-
cial asset or trading venue. Deriving such formula is a challenging task due to the
lack of trade activity and data in various asset classes. For instance, investment-
grade fixed income securities are traded in quote driven over-the-counter markets
(OTC), with no transaction visibility, whereas large common stocks are often found
9
in more liquid order driven electronic exchanges. Hence, the functional formula
for the market impact would vary according to assets characteristics and trading
pattern.
Market microstructure literature has discussed a number of market impact/ cost
functions, with theoretical studies arriving at a model of linear functional form,
where price impact is said to be proportional to the volume of security traded in
the market. On the other hand, an overwhelming number of practitioners have
purported a square root model, which suggests a marginal price impact diminishes
as the trade volume increases (Kyle and Obizhaeva, 2018). Despite the presence
of some empirical evidence for the square root model of market impact, both
practitioners and academics agree that the model is not exact and is not aligned
with the theoretical research (Bouchaud, 2009).
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to conduct a robust empirical analysis of
the market impact functional form and validate it against existing models. The
novelty of our methodology lies in the advanced statistical tools adopted. Specifi-
cally, the study will examine the application of machine learning techniques to the
derivation of a market cost function. Unlike traditional regression analysis that
suffers from limitations such as “curse of dimensionality” (the model becomes
mathematically intractable when dealing with a large number of explanatory vari-
ables), machine learning (ML) has been proven to provide robust results in many
higher-dimensional financial applications. This is because of its ability to fit and
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predict using complex data sets (Park, Lee and Son, 2016). With the increas-
ing availability of high-frequency market trading data, we are now at an acute
juncture where we can begin to conduct meaningful studies of the relationship
between order flow, liquidity and price impact in order-driven markets. In doing
so we hope to facilitate a better understanding of market impact function given
the gap between current empirical findings and the theory.
Being able to model market impact more accurately is essential for a better under-
standing of how trades affect prices and how to quantify the degree of this impact
as well as it’s dynamics (Gue´ant, 2016). This knowledge of the price formation
process would empower both practitioners and academics to arrive at models that
better depict observed market behaviour, further contributing to the efficiency and
stability of modern market microstructure.
1.3 Research Objective
The focus of this research is to derive a functional form of market impact using
parametric ML algorithm. To achieve this, a detailed investigation of the key
drivers affecting liquidity is required; with an emphasis on observing the conse-
quences of executing large orders by exploiting data from a stock exchange.
A series of experiments will be carried out using the scientific method to statis-
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tically reconstruct the dynamics of NASDAQ Limit Order Book (LOB). LOBs
contain detailed information about the interplay between liquidity providers (i.e.,
market makers) and liquidity takers. This permits us to select microstructure fea-
tures (explanatory variables) that underpin price impact, and thus, need to be
included in its function definition. These features will then serve as input features
to the ML algorithm.
The work will be conducted in a controlled environment, examining liquid stocks.
This allows for a vast and rich data set that can facilitate precise and robust
numeric results. As parametric models are often prone to overfitting (thus, bad
forecasting), we look to reduce both bias and variance errors by conducting cross-
validation of the derived model. The latter involves dividing the training data set
in random parts and fitting the model on each partition (known as out-of-sample
testing).
To summarise, the aims of this study are:
1. Investigate key drivers affecting liquidity in equities markets
2. Derive a functional form of market impact using machine learning algorithm
3. Compare machine learning predictive performance against traditional statis-
tical models using cross validation
12
1.4 Thesis Structure
The structure of this thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 - Background and Literature Review is a review of key terms and
introduction to the research environment.
• Chapter 3 - Data and Research Methodology describes the dataset and the
approach adopted throughout the study.
• Chapter 4 - Empirical Study illustrates the outcomes of our experiments;
and discusses the implications of the findings.
• Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Future Work is a summary of our key results
and suggestions for future works.
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2 Literature Review
No respectable model exists without an appropriate understanding of the sys-
tem rules and challenges faced by domain practitioners, as well as empirical facts.
To facilitate a comprehensive study of the functional form of market impact, we
must first consider several key concepts present in the Market Microstructure lit-
erature.
Market microstructure forms a long and rich history of differing viewpoints, with
academics (economist, physicists, and mathematicians) and practitioners (regu-
latory policymakers and investors) typically residing at two distinct ends of the
spectrum. As we will discuss, all such perspectives have their confines and inter-
sect. Developing a coherent understanding of these themes is a long and complex
endeavour. This chapter serves to situate these issues within the current research
anatomy.
2.1 A Brief Primer on Market Microstructure
The microstructure of a market is characterised by the interactions of the kinds of
participants, and rules governed by regulators. These rules focus on minimizing
any friction arising at the level of trading venues, as well as how the exchange of
assets takes place in very specific settings.
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The term market microstructure was first coined by Garman (1976), in the paper
of the same title, where he describes the moment-to-moment trading activities
in asset markets. The field has since emerged as an effervescent research area
of prominent importance. A substantial number of changes have occurred since
the expressions first usage. For example, the price formation process has been
impacted by the fragmentation of markets in major financial hubs such as the
US and Europe (e.g., introduction of Dark Pools – alternative trading systems
with no visible liquidity, for which market activities take place away from public
exchanges), no doubt due to the abundance of technological advances (i.e., au-
tomation of trading and the development of execution algorithms). These modern
market designs have prompted new questions for modelers.
However, information remains a key dimension at the heart of the prevailing mi-
crostructure studies. The first iterations of models embracing this notion of infor-
mation were developed during the last quarter of the 20th century. Economists
such as Kyle (1985), provided an in-depth analysis of how information is conveyed
into prices; and the impact of asymmetric information on liquidity in general. This
notion that “market prices are an efficient way of transmitting the information re-
quired to arrive at a Pareto optimal allocation of resources” (Grossman, 1976) –
is a natural emerging property of microstructure studies that aim to identify how
different trading conditions and rules promote, or hinder, price efficiency. That is,
many classical (static and dynamic) microstructure models describe the process
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by which new information comes to be reflected in prices. This transmission of
information into transactions and prices is deeply related to market impact, provi-
sion of liquidity and determinants of the bid-ask spread. These topics were often
the focus of much of the earlier academic literature.
The first academic papers focussing on optimal execution were those of Bertsimas
and Lo (1998), Almgren and Chriss (1999) and Almgren and Chriss (2001), with
interest in the subject only truly proliferating beyond 2000 (Gue´ant, 2016). Mod-
els incorporating the use of limit orders (visible orders resting in the LOB) and
dark pools soon followed. Appendix B.2 describes earlier LOB models and their
evolution.
These new models featured more complex variables such as trading volatility and
involve coefficients that need to be estimated using high-frequency datasets (time
series of market data observed at extremely fine scales, i.e., milliseconds). Many
statisticians are now acutely involved in the study of market microstructure, bring-
ing with them advanced methods based on stochastic calculus that allow for better
estimation of parameters given the data. More specifically, there are several im-
portant pieces of literature on high-frequency liquidity provision. This began in
2008 with the publication of Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) who presented a model
of market dynamics, comprising of a complex partial differential equation (PDE)
that was solved by Gue´ant, Lehalle and Fernandez Tapia (2013).
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Today, quantitative research on market microstructures is more concerned with
the importance of pre- and post- trade transparency, the optimal tick size, the role
of alternative trading venues, clearing and settlement of standardized products,
amongst others.
Nonetheless, there remains room for improvements when it comes to more real-
istic dynamic market models that better depict widely observed, but still poorly
understood micro- and macro- structure phenomena (Bouchaud et al., 2018). To
examine this relationship between market dynamics and some exogenous variables
such as volume and order-flow imbalance, we must first review the properties of
prominent models of market impact.
2.2 Market Impact
As we have deliberated, the notion of liquidity in financial markets is an elusive
concept. However, from a practical stance, one of its most important metrics is the
response of price as a function of order-flow imbalance (i.e., excess volume with
respect to the order sign). This response is known as market impact.
In much of the literature, there are three distinct strands of interpretation for the
cause of market impact, which reflects the great divide between efficient market
enthusiasts and sceptics:
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1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) posits that all available informa-
tion is reflected in prices as rational agents immediately arbitrage away any
deviation from the fair price. In the efficient market framework, rational
agents who believe that asset prices are always close to their fundamental
value “successfully forecast short-term price movement”. This can result in
a measurable correlation between trade sign and subsequent price change
(Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo, 2009). under this interpretation, as empha-
sised by Hasbrouck (2007), “. . . orders do not impact prices. It is more accu-
rate to state that orders forecast prices”, thus, noise-induced trades carrying
no information yield no long-term price impact as prices would otherwise
deviate from their fundamental value.
2. The second picture reinforces the first in that market impact is the apparatus
by which prices adapt to new information as illustrated in the aforementioned
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) models; therefore permitting
information about the fundamental value of the asset to be incorporated into
prices.
3. The third perspective resonates with that of the efficient market sceptic.
Here, in the absence of fundamental price nor private information, zero-
intelligent models describe how prices impact is a reaction to order-flow im-
balance. In Farmer, Patelli and Zovko (2005) Santa Fe model, they delineate
a completely stochastic order-flow process by which the act of trading itself is
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tautologically seen as the physical medium statistically interpreted as price
impact.
Though all three interpretations result in a positive correlation between trade signs,
volume and price impact (response function), they are conceptually very distinct.
In the first two pictures, trades reveal private information about the fundamental
value of assets, resulting in a price discovery process. In the latter mechanical
interpretation, one should remain agnostic of the informational content of trades
and should instead speak of price formation.
Trading impacts prices – this is an undisputable empirical observation. However,
the interpretation of this impact is still widely debated; whether prices are formed
or discovered remains a topic of discussion with no clear consensus at this stage.
But because of the unclear distinction between true information and noise, one
can assume reality lies somewhere between all three extremes (Bouchaud et al.,
2018).
The concepts of adverse selection and market impact are often captured by asym-
metric information models describing why liquidity providers actions should de-
pend on the behaviour of other market participants. A key early reference on
the subject is the seminal Kyle (1985), which provides an elegant explanation of
how impact arises from liquidity providers fears of adverse selection when trading
against highly informed traders. Albeit not very realistic, the model is a concrete
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illustration of how private information comes to be reflected in the price of an asset.
Moreover, economic models further provide important insights into the challenges
faced by MM. In this regard, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) work demonstrate how
the bid-ask spread must compensate MM for adverse selection when trading in a
competitive market.
2.2.1 Price Impact Models
The market microstructure literature has studied a diverse range of market im-
pact models. However, despite many decades of theoretical and empirical research,
there remains a vast number of open questions regarding its functional form (Kyle
and Obizhaeva, 2018). This is in part due to the varying characteristics of assets
as dictated by their market microstructure. Moreover, as outlined in Almgren et
al. (2005), there are different classes of market impact that must be distinguished.
Before presenting our empirical investigation, we consider some heuristic models
of market price dynamics. These models intuitively encapsulate the strategic con-
siderations of market participants by examining the delicate balance in liquidity
maintained by ongoing competition between rational agents.
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Linear and Permanent Impact: The Kyle Model
Kyle (1985) proposed a classic toy model which seeks to shed light on the mech-
anisms by which private information is gradually propagated into prices in an
efficient market. The model was further extended in (Kyle (1989) to account for
the case of several competing informed traders. Kyle’s original model assumes
the simple case of a normal distributed random variable (Kyle’s Lambda λ) and
derives a single statistical measure of the impact that is both linear in traded vol-
ume (order size) and permanent in time. In this framework, market dynamics are
juxtaposed as a contest between an inside trader (who holds unique information
regarding the fair price of an asset) and a noise trader (who submits random or-
ders in the absence of actual knowledge) whom submit orders that are cleared by
a Market Maker (MM) at every time step ∆t. In the model, the price adjustment
rule ∆p of the MM must be linear in the total signed volume εv, i.e.,
∆p = λεV (1)
This gauges the market impact of a trade as a consequence of volume flow imbal-
ance, where λ is a measure of impact and is inversely proportional to the liquidity
of the market. The consecutive price adjustment is further permanent, i.e., the
price change between time t = 0 and t = T = N∆t is:
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pt = p0 +
N−1∑
n=0
pn = p0 + λ
N−1∑
n=0
εnVn (2)
Formula 2 assumes that the impact λnVn of trades in the nth time interval persists
unconditionally unabated up to time T . It is clear that the signs of the trade
must be serially uncorrelated if the price is to follow a stochastic path. Within the
model’s framework, the trading schedule of the informed insider is precisely such
that εn are uncorrelated (Kyle, 1985). Conversely, data from the real markets
reveal autocorrelation in the signs of the traded volumes over prolonged time
frames as empirically observed by Bouchaud et al. (2003).
In summary, Kyle’s model elicits some elegant deep truths about how markets
function, but also fails to capture the essence of important empirical properties
of real markets. In the model, the mechanism by which information comes to be
reflected in prices (price impact) is due to the MM’s attempt to predict the infor-
mational content comprised in the order-flow and adjusts their prices accordingly.
Additionally, price impact is said to be linear (i.e., price changes are proportional
to the order flow imbalance) and permanent (i.e., there is no decay of impact ex-
hibited). In the context of LOBs, linear impact is a generic consequence of a finite
liquidity density (buy/ sell orders) in the vicinity of the price, and permanent im-
pact is the outcome of liquidity immediately refilling the subsequent consumption
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gap caused by the market order, as demonstrated by Obizhaeva and Wang (2013).
Because of impact, informed traders restrict their trading volume to optimise re-
turns. Thus, despite private information, the amount of profit that can be made
by exploiting this insider knowledge is limited.
Concave Transient Impact: The Square Root Model
Kyle’s original model assumes a linear dependency of impact on traded volume, but
this requires a variety of idealised assumptions that may be violated in real markets
(Zarinell et al., 2015). A key finding is that impact is not only mechanical, but also
dynamic, meaning it cannot simply be described by revealed supply or demand of a
visible LOB (Weber and Rosenow, 2005). The impact is rather related to the latent
underlying liquidity – hidden supply and demand, not reflected in the LOB. This
stems from the fact that even highly liquid markets only offer very small volumes
of liquidity for immediate execution (see Appendix B.1). Consequently, trades
must be fragmented creating long memory in the sign of the order-flow as private
information is slowly incorporated into prices. This, however, is incompatible with
the permanent impact (as described by (Kyle (1985)), which would otherwise lead
to trends, i.e., strong autocorrelated price changes (Bouchaud, 2009).
As an alternative, the square root model of market impact was first proposed by
Torre (1997) based on empirical regularities observed by Loeb (1983). Empirical
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studies have since ubiquitously found market impact to indeed be a non-linear
concave function in the size of meta-orders (large orders fragmented into a number
of smaller market orders) and fading in time (Bouchaud, 2009). This concave
nature of market impact is universally observed over several heterogeneous datasets
in terms of markets (including equities, FX, futures, bitcoins and even OTC credit
markets as reported by Eisler, Bouchaud and Kockelkoren (2012), epochs and
execution styles. On this note, it is worth mentioning that some studies report
empirical deviations from the square-root law, e.g., Almgren et al. (2005) and
Zarinell et al. (2015).
Nonetheless, in all former cases, the square root model is consistently simple and
empirically realistic. Let G denote the percentage cost of executing a meta-order
of size Q shares of a stock with price P , expressed as a fraction of the value of the
trade |P Q|. Let σ denote the assets return (daily) volatility, and let V denote
the assets (average) daily traded volume in shares per day. The square root law
of market impact is thus described by the relationship
G = g(σ, P, V ;Q) ∼ σ
( |Q|
V
) 1
2
(3)
where g(·) defines the functional form for the model and the notation ”∼” means
“is proportional to”. The market impact G is a dimensionless (absolute) quantity,
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which is the same regardless of the units of measurement for impact Q, V, and σ.
Even though model (3) seems a reasonable indication of transaction costs, there
still no consensus on whether or not price impact is indeed described by the square
root function. The exponent varies within a range of 0.4 to 0.7. For example,
empirical findings by Almgren et al. (2005) and Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) find
an exponent closer to 0.6, but average observations suggest a power closer to 0.5
(square root). We note that the only conditional variable is the total traded volume
Q. This is surprising as it implies that the time taken to completely liquidate
(respectively acquire) and execution path are not important factors in determining
market impact. Nevertheless, real data shows that impact does depend on such
dynamics, thus, power law, as often referenced, should, therefore, be seen as a good
first-order-approximation. Whilst this result is in stark contrast with classical
economic literature (which asserts linear impact (Kyle, 1985)), it is perfectly in
accordance with the fact that instantaneous observed liquidity is limited in real
markets further indicating that markets may be inherently fragile.
Our empirical study aims to quantify how liquidity providers react to the arrival
of market orders. The following section provides the foundation of the statistical
approaches employed in this research. By outlining the analysis methodology
and exploring more recent developments in the area of data analytics, we hope
to facilitate a practical solution for accurately measuring order-flow, therefore,
providing clarity on many obscurities surrounding price impact.
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3 Data and Research Methodology
3.1 Electronic Markets
3.1.1 Limit Orderbook (LOB) Trading
Digital markets, generally, facilitate trade by automatically matching those want-
ing to sell with those wanting to buy. Market participants express their willingness
to trade a specific quantity at a specific price by submitting orders to the exchange.
At a high level, all orders are classified by their type as Market Orders (MO) or
Limit Orders (LO). MOs indicate an immediate need to execute the trade. LOs,
on the other hand, are known as passive orders because these usually do not re-
sult in an instant execution. LOs are often submitted at a price worse than the
current market price, and therefore, have to wait until either a new order arrives
that matches LO price or the LO is withdrawn. All active (non-cancelled) LOs
are placed in a queue according to their corresponding price. This order queue is
managed within the LOB, whilst mapping of orders is conducted by the matching
engine.
LOB is defined on a fixed discrete grid of prices where submitted LOs are recorded
in separate price level queues. Figure 1 illustrates a sample snapshot of LOB:
vertical blue and red bars represent queues of LOs to buy and sell respectively.
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The length of each queue is defined by the number and sizes of orders that have
been submitted at that price, but not yet matched for execution. The scale of
price and volume axis is defined by LOB resolution parameters – tick and lot sizes
respectively. The tick size is the smallest possible change in the price of an asset.
In other words, the tick size defines the precision of the quoted price. On the other
hand, the lot size defines the smallest amount (expressed as the number of shares)
of security that can be traded within the LOB.
When a new buy or sell LO comes in, it is added to the end of the corresponding
price queue – on the top of previous LOs at that level, see Figure 1. The difference
between the best (lowest) ask and the best (highest) bid prices is known as the
spread; while the arithmetic average of these best quotes is called the mid-price.
Mid-price is often used to describe the LOB and its dynamics (as opposed to look-
ing at individual behaviour of the bid and ask prices). Therefore, when examining
the market impact of orders, we are interested in how mid-price had changed in
response to the execution of MOs. Note that in some cases, it is more appropriate
to examine micro-price – the weighted (by inverse volume) average of the bid and
the ask. It comes to be more useful when the imbalance of the orderbook is used
for prediction of the sign of future price changes as emphasised in Cartea, Jaimun-
gal and Penalva (2015) and Bouchaud et al. (2018). In this study, however, we
use mainly the mid-price.
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Figure 1: Illustration of LOB dynamics (Bonart and Gould, 2017).
Matching engine, or matching algorithm, is a well-defined procedure on how to
orders are select and execute. Predominantly, in electronic markets, the algorithm
tries to map MOs first – if two MOs match then these are executed immediately. If
a new MO does not have an opposite side matching MO at the time of submission,
it is executed against LOs in a price-time priority order. That is, an incoming
MO is first mapped to the oldest LO at the opposite side best price. Then, if
the quantity demanded by MO is not fulfilled, it is executed against earlier LOs
(still at the best available price). It is interesting to note that not all matching
engines abide by a price-time priority queuing mechanism. Alternative matching
engines such as the prorata rules are often found in alternative market structures
(e.g., in money markets). Under the prorata model, there is no explicit time-
priority rule. MOs are instead matched against LOs posted at the best opposite
price – proportionate to the quantity posted. Moreover, there are other markets
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that combine the two approaches, adopting both time-priority and pro-rate (i.e.,
Futures).
Traditionally, if the full size of MO cannot be fulfilled by LOs resting at the best
price, the matching algorithm would try to execute the rest of MO against LOs
at the second, third and so on best prices; until the full quantity of LO is filled
(walking the book). However, modern financial markets implement alternative
procedures for handling situations where there is not enough liquidity at the best
price to which the entire MO can be matched. For example, in the US, trading
venues are obliged by regulators to provide participants with the best possible
price for the asset. This means that, depending on the specific order type, the
exchange may re-route the remaining units of an unfulfilled order to alternative
venue displaying the same best quote. While re-routing can certainly affect liq-
uidity (thus price impact) in the market, empirical observations such as Bouchaud
et al. (2018) find that only a few orders are bigger than the available volume at
the best quote. This indicates that traders try to adapt their order volumes to the
available quotes.
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3.2 The Dataset
3.2.1 Lobster Data
In our research, we will be specifically analysing trades and quotes data from the
NASDAQ electronic stock exchange (for more information on NASDAQ please
see Appendix C.1). The time-series data has been provisioned from the academic
database LOBSTER (Limit Order Book System Efficient Reconstructor) that of-
fers on-demand LOB data, reconstructed from NASDAQ’s Historical TotalView-
ITCH files. TotalView-ITCH is a standard NASDAQ data feed which illustrates
the full depth of the order book (resting limit orders), as well as all market events.
This data feed is consumed in a form of message files which record every state
change to the order book, as opposed to recording timely snapshots. TotalView-
ITCH message data contains all visible order activities, such as submission, can-
cellation, and matching of limit orders. Therefore, as outlined in the paper by
LOBSTER development team, the platform can reconstruct LOB for a NASDAQ
stock at any required book depth level for the specified period (Huang, Lehalle
and Rosenbaum, 2015). For a detailed procedure on how LOBSTER reconstructs
LOB data, please refer to Appendix C.2.
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3.2.2 Output Format
Market activity for a stock on a trading day is organised into two LOBSTER
output files:
1. ‘Message’ file contains every arriving market and limit orders as well as
cancellations and updates – in other words, all trades data
2. ‘Orderbook’ file depicts the evolving state of the LOB. It describes how the
total volume of buy or sell orders at corresponding price level changes after
each market event. This information is displayed as a list of all successive
quotes
For every entry in the message file, there is a corresponding record in the orderbook
file that describes how the order book advanced immediately after the message file
event.
Tables 2 and 3 correspond to snapshots of message and orderbook files for the
same stock during the same time (measured in the number of market events). An
event of type 4 at the timestamp of 43955.2426 (Table 2) illustrates the execution
of a buy LO at the ask price 2158800. The size of this order is 10 shares; thus,
we observe corresponding Bid Volume entry in the orderbook decreasing by 10.
Furthermore, the next arriving MO (represented by LO execution at 43955.2426
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Time–stamp Event Type Order ID Size Order Price Direction
43955.2422 4 140339446 5 2158800 1
43955.2426 4 140339446 10 2158800 1
43955.2426 4 140339446 75 2158800 1
43955.2426 3 140339455 100 2159600 -1
43955.2426 1 140339468 100 2159500 -1
43955.2442 3 140339468 100 2159500 -1
43955.2468 1 140339505 100 2158900 -1
43955.2484 5 0 300 2158800 -1
43955.2512 3 140339505 100 2158800 -1
43955.2513 1 140339541 100 2159600 -1
Table 2: Sample entries in ‘message’ file
Ask Price Ask Volume Bid Price Bid Volume
2159600 100 2158800 85
2159600 100 2158800 75
2159600 100 2158300 20
2160800 100 2158300 20
2159500 100 2158300 20
2160800 100 2158300 20
2158900 100 2158300 20
2158900 100 2158300 20
2160800 100 2158300 20
Table 3: Sample entries in the ‘orderbook’ file at Level 1
in Table 2) consumes all available liquidity of 75 shares and the best bid price
changes permanently to 2158300 (next best price level in the LOB). In this work, we
implement an algorithm that detects this kind of price changing events and explores
the causal relationship between market impact and observed LOB features.
In summary, the information contained in output LOBSTER files has the below
properties:
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• All events have timestamps of seconds after midnight with the precision of at
least milliseconds (nanoseconds depending on the requested period). When
a market order is matched against several limit orders, each matching is
recorded separately (both in message and orderbook files) but with the same
timestamp. This allows reconstruction of the initial market order volume.
• There are seven types of market events that are recorded in LOBSTER data
(see Table 4 below). For this study, we are interested in market orders which
correspond to event types 4 and 5 – execution of either visible or hidden
limit orders. A more detailed explanation of why other types of events are
out of scope follows in the Empirical Findings chapter.
• Order ID corresponds to the unique order reference number. Zero reference
number corresponds to a hidden limit order. Note that order ID is distinct
from an ID of a trader/ broker who submitted the order. In other words,
knowing the order ID does not allow to reconstruct the ownership of trades,
but provides information about a lifespan of a single trade.
• Size of a trade is measured in the number of shares.
• Price is depicted in dollars times 10000. For instance, 2158800 corresponds
to $215.88.
• Direction indicates whether a buy or a sell order has been executed:
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– -1: Execution of sell LO, therefore, a MO to buy has been matched at
ask price
– 1: Execution of buy LO, therefore, a MO to sell has been matched at
the bid price
The prevailing majority of microstructure literature that we have consulted
during our study adopts the opposite nomenclature. To remain consistent
with the subject expertise we follow earlier examples and use trade sign of
-1 to indicate sell MO and 1 for buy MO.
• Orderbook file entries are composed of the ask price and the corresponding
volume, as well as the bid price and its volume. The best prices are Level 1
offerings – the cheapest price to buy at (ask), and the biggest price to sell at
(bid) from a viewpoint of a trader submitting a MO. Typically, orderbook
has several price levels: from the best Level 1 to the second-best, the third
best and so on. However, as we recall from the earlier discussion of the LOB,
in most electronic exchanges today, an order is re-routed to other markets
if the available volume at the best price is less than the order size. Hence,
nowadays, an order rarely “walks the book” (being matched with LOs at
a worse price on a different price level). Following suit, we will be looking
primarily on the Level 1 price changes in the LOB.
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Event Number Event Type
1 Submission of a new limit order
2 Cancellation (partial deletion of a limit order)
3 Deletion (total deletion of a limit order)
4 Execution of a visible limit order
5 Execution of a hidden limit order
6 Cross Trade (Auction Trade)
7 Trading halt indicator
Table 4: Event Types in LOBSTER data
3.2.3 Observed Stocks
The analysis is conducted on four NASDAQ stocks – large tick SIRI and EBAY;
and small tick TSLA and PCLN. Conventionally, the tick size is the smallest
movement in the price of an asset. On NASDAQ each asset is traded in its own
book with the tick size of $0.01. Size of the tick is uniform across all NASDAQ
listed securities, despite their prices varying significantly across several magnitudes.
Relative tick size, then, is defined as a ratio between dollar tick size and the price of
a stock. Securities with smaller traded prices have a large relative tick size, while
those that trade at higher prices per share have a smaller ratio between tick size
and stock price. Large tick stocks are known to have the bid-ask spread almost
always equal to one tick, whilst smaller tick securities usually have spreads of a
few ticks (Eisler, Bouchaud and Kockelkoren, 2012). The relative tick size and
spread indicate how actively an asset is traded on an exchange.
We have chosen to work with different (in this regard) stocks to be able to quan-
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titatively observe the influence of a tick size on trading features.
The initial objective of our study was to use trades and quotes data for the selected
stocks during the first six months of 2015 (2nd of January to 30th of June 2015).
Depending on the stock, the average number of daily market events varies from
8,000 to over 200,000. Among these, we are interested in the price impact of MOs
specifically. Table 5 lists an average daily number of MOs for each asset.
Ticker Number of MOs
SIRI 624
EBAY 3540
TSLA 3924
PCLN 1333
Table 5: Average daily number of MOs for each stock
During the first six months of 2015, there have been 124 NASDAQ trading days
which gives us a total number of relevant MO events of the order of 105. This
implies that our dataset is sufficiently large, ensuring significant robustness in any
statistical findings. In the later empirical discussion, we elaborate further on the
nature of what we have learned from the data and how our results compare to
other studies that use similar LOBSTER dataset.
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3.3 Method Development
The methods employed in this research are solely based on the principles of the
scientific method. The process of the scientific method begins with the formulation
of a question based on observations. This allows a hypothesis to be formed that
may explain an observed phenomenon. In this instance, a hypothesis may be ”do
large orders impact prices?” The null hypothesis is large orders of size (traded
volume) Q > Z do not impact prices, where Q denotes the order size.
After formulation of a hypothesis, it is up to the scientist to disprove the null
hypothesis and demonstrate that orders of a predefined defined (large) size do in
fact impact prices. To carry this out a prediction must be defined. To prove or
disprove the hypothesis, the prediction is subject to testing.
The results of the testing procedure will provide a statistical answer upon whether
the null hypothesis can be rejected at a certain level of confidence. If the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, which implies that there was no discernible rela-
tionship between the size of an order and the price impact, it is still possible that
the hypothesis is (partially) true. A larger set of data, a transformation of variables
or incorporation of additional information can be used to optimise and improve
the level of significance. This is the process of analysis and it seeks to reject the
null hypothesis after refinement. For more details on statistical inference please
refer to Appendix C.5 and Appendix C.6.
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3.3.1 Machine Learning
Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that facilitates
automated methods of data analysis. More broadly, ML defines a series of adaptive
computational algorithms that automatically detect patterns in multi-dimensional
datasets (panel or time-series data with a large number of observed variables) and
makes use of these uncovered patterns to predict values of interest or perform other
kinds of decision making under uncertainty (known as generalisation).
The conventional tool of statistical analyses in finance – econometrics – mainly
focuses on multivariate linear regression. Linear regression does not have memory
(standard econometric models do not learn), thus fails to improve its performance
with new observations. Consequently, econometric regression analysis often falls
short in understanding the full spectrum of informational content present in the
data. Moreover, when applied to complex problems, more traditional statistical
tools often suffer from various limitations (i.e., the “curse of dimensionality” – the
model becomes mathematically intractable when dealing with a large number of
explanatory variables/ features), whilst ML algorithm can learn patterns in high-
dimensional space without being specifically directed. In this regard, ML methods
do not replace the theory and conventional wisdom of econometrics but simply
enhance and guide them.
The defining attribute that differentiates ML from such conventional tools is the
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algorithms’ ability to learn (i.e., improve predictive accuracy with time) from ex-
perience with respect to a task and performance measure (Mitchell, 1997). Here,
experience refers to the past information available to a learner (typically taking
the form of electronic training data). Thus, ML algorithms learn patterns in a
high-dimensional space without being explicitly directed (i.e., programmed with
pre-specifications). Such algorithms are incredibly diverse, ranging from more
traditional statistical models that emphasise inference to deep neural network ar-
chitecture that excel at highly complex classification and predictive tasks. As the
success of learning is greatly dependant on the data used, ML most closely relates
to statistics and data mining, though it has a different emphasis and vocabulary.
ML tasks are generally classified into three broad areas: Supervised Learning,
Unsupervised Learning and Reinforcement Learning. In the current study, we
specifically focus on Supervised Learning, which is the most commonly used class
of ML. Please refer to Appendix C.4 for information on other forms of ML.
Supervised Learning describes a set of predictive learning models for which the
presence of outcome variables guides the learning process. That is, data annotated
with values such as categories (as in supervised classification) or numeric responses
(as in supervised regression) facilitates external supervision of the learning process.
The objective is to learn a mapping from inputs x to outputs y, given the labelled
set of input-output pairs D = (xi, yi)Ni=1. Here D represents the training set,
and N is the number of training examples. Given the set of labelled examples,
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the algorithm is trained on the data and learns which predictive factors are most
influential to the responses. When applied to new unseen datasets, supervised
learning algorithms attempt to make predictions based on their prior training
experience. In the simplest setting, each training input xi corresponds to a D-
dimensional vector of values that correspond to various attributes of the observed
phenomenon. These are known as features and could range from a time-series of
observations to more complex structured objects such as an image or a molecular
shape.
Similarly, the form of the output dependent variable (known as the response vari-
able) can in principle take on any structure, however, most methods assume that
yi is a categorical variable from some finite set yi ∈ 1, . . . , C or Yi ∈ R (a real-
valued continuous scalar). This research makes explicit use of regression-based
supervised algorithms, for which we will delineate the basic mechanisms below.
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Multi-Linear Regression
Linear regression is a familiar and widely adopted statistical technique. This
asserts that a continuous scalar response y is the result of a linear combination
of its feature inputs x. Unlike multivariate linear regression, where the model
predicts multiple correlated dependent variables given multiple input variables,
multi-linear models output a single real value scalar. That is:
y (x) = βTx+  =
D∑
j=1
βjxj+ (4)
Where βT , x ∈ Rp+1 and  ∼ N (µ, σ2). That is, βT and x are both real-
valued vectors of dimension p + 1, representing the inner scalar product between
the input vector x and the models’ weight vector βT ., the residual error between
our linear predictions and the true response, is normally distributed with mean µ
and variance σ2. The multi-linear regression model makes the strong assumption
of independent and identical distribution (IID) of errors. That is, the distribution
of the errors is identical across observations and the errors are independent of
each other (knowing one error does not assist in forecasting the next error). When
plotted, such a distribution produces the well know Gaussian (normal) distribution.
To make the connection between linear regression and Gaussian distributions more
explicit, we can express the model in the form:
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p (y|x, θ) = N (µ (x) , σ2 (x)) (5)
This makes it clear that the model is a conditional probability density. In the
simplest case, we assume µ is a linear function of x, thus µ = βTx; and the noise
(as measured by variance) is fixed as σ2(x) = σ2. In this case, θ = (β, σ2 are the
parameters of the model.
Multilinear regression forms the basis of many of the more sophisticated supervised
ML techniques employed. From the defined model specification, it is intuitive to
ask how the coefficient β is estimated. Further, we introduce two methods for
optimal β estimation.
Least Squares
The Least Squares is the most common approach to learn the parameters of a
hyperplane by approximating coefficients that best fit the generated output for a
specified input set. The difference between the model’s prediction and the actual
outcome for a given data point denotes the residual, whereas the deviation of the
model from the true population output is called the error. The method of Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS – a type of Least Squares used for estimating the parameters
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in a linear regression model) entails taking each vertical distance from a data point
to the regression line (residual), squaring this distance (taking an absolute value
by disregarding the sign) and then minimising the total sum of squared residuals,
see Figure 2. In more formal terms, the least square estimation method chooses
the coefficient vector β to minimise the residual sum of squares (RSS, also known
as the sum of squared errors SSE) so that the model fits the data as closely as
possible. Hence, the least-squares coefficients βLS are computed as
arg min
βLS
= RSS(β) :=
N∑
i=1
(yi − βTxi)2 (6)
The vertical distances are usually minimised as opposed to the horizontal distances
or those taken perpendicular to the line. This arises as a result of the assumption
that x is fixed in repeated samples so that the problem becomes one of determining
the appropriate model for y given (or conditional upon) the observed values of x.
For simplicity, the latter term can be expressed in matrix form. By defining the
N × (p+ 1) matrix x, it is possible to write the RSS term as:
RSS(β) = (y − xβ)T (y − xβ) (7)
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Figure 2: Method of OLS fitting a line (described by the model) to the data by
minimising the sum of squared residuals (Murphy, 2012).
This term is now differentiated with respect to (w.r.t.) the parameter variable β:
∂RSS
∂β
= −2xT (y − xβ) (8)
A key assumption about the data is made here: the matrix xTx must be positive-
definite, which is only true if there are more observational datapoints than there
are dimensions. If this does not hold (as is often the case in high-dimensional
data settings) then it is not possible to find a unique β coefficient, thus the above
matrix equation cannot hold. Under the assumption of a positive-definite xTx the
partial differential (PDE) is set to zero and solved for β:
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xT (y − xβ) = 0 (9)
The solution to this matrix equation provides βˆOLS
βˆOLS = (x
Tx)
−1
xTy (10)
Maximum Likelihood
An alternative to OLS, the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) is an optimi-
sation process to estimate the coefficients of a statistical model given a particular
batch of data by maximizing the likelihood function (defines how likely a set of
observations is to occur given the model parameters). The estimator differs from
probabilities in that it is not normalised to range from 0 to 1. MLE is a directed
algorithmic search through a high-dimensional set of possible parameter choices,
attempting to answer the question: If the data were to have been generated by
the model, what parameter choices were most likely to have been used? (Murphy,
2012).
This reduces to a conditional likelihood problem of seeing the dataset D, given a
specific set of parameters θ. The value sought is the θ that maximises p(D|θ). This
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can be framed as searching for the mode of the p(D|θ) denoted by θˆ, expressed as
θˆ , arg max
θ
log p(D|θ) (11)
In linear regression problems, we often assume that the errors are IID. This sim-
plifies the solution of the log-likelihood by making use of properties of the natural
logarithms, permitting us to express it as
`θˆ , log p(D|θ) =
N∑
i=1
log p(yi|xi, θ) (12)
In the case of normal distribution of residuals, maximising the log-likelihood func-
tion returns the same parameter solution as Least Squares.
3.3.2 Goodness Of Fit
It is often desirable to measure how well the regression line (described by the
model) fits the data (i.e., explains the variation in the outcome response func-
tion). Goodness-of-fit statistical measures rigorously assess the quality of the
sample regression function (SRF) specifications, permitting us to select model de-
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signs that best estimate the true relationship between observed variables. Promi-
nent goodness-of-fit measures, including the coefficient of determination (R-squared
(R2)) and adjusted R-squared, are based on maximising the outcome of least-square
estimates.
• R2 measures the proportion of total variation in the observed data explained
by the model and ranges from 0 to 1. R2 is computed as R2 = 1 − RSS
TSS
,
where TSS is the total sum of squared deviations of the outcome from its
mean, given by
TSS =
∑
i
(yi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi)
2 (13)
and RSS is the residual sum of squares (the sum of all of the squared dif-
ferences between the actual datapoints and the corresponding estimated val-
ues), expressed as
RSS =
∑
i
(yi − yˆi)2 (14)
The objective is to maximise R2 - the closer the value of R2 is to 1 the
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better the regression model fits the data (when compared to the mean of the
observation). R2 only illustrates how one variable explains the observation.
When more explanatory variables are added to the model an alternative
adjusted R2 should be used.
• Adjusted R2 penalises for increasing the feature space with non-significant
explanatory variables, by reducing RSS to produce a superior goodness-of-fit.
Both R2 and adjusted R2 are not ideal for time-series predictive modelling as they
only reflect the models’ precision in fitting past values, which is not indicative of
future predictions.
Alternative prominent goodness-of-fit measures are discussed in Appendix C.7.
3.3.3 Feature Engineering
ML algorithms are only capable of learning if the training set contains sufficient
relevant variables in the feature space and minimum irrelevant ones. A critical
aspect of a success ML initiative is producing a good set of features for which the
algorithm can be trained on. This process is known as feature engineering and
involves:
1. Feature Extraction – combining existing features to produce a more useful
variable
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2. Feature Selection – selecting the most useful/ relevant features to train the
algorithm on amongst an existing set of features.
3.3.4 Cross–Validation
It could be stated that the defining quality of a successful ML algorithm is its abil-
ity to generalise across future unseen datasets. To ensure accuracy and robustness
of a model it is necessary to define a loss function which measures the predictive
precision of our model, as a function of the generalisation error. In a regression
setting, a common loss function is given by the Mean Squared Error (MSE) - a
smaller MSE means the estimate is more accurate. It is defined as:
MSE :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
|yi − yˆi|2 (15)
This states that the generalisation error of a model, given a particular set of
data, is the average of squared differences between the training values yi and their
associated estimates yˆi. This function heavily penalises estimate values that differ
greatly from the true observations (by squaring the differences). A small value of
a loss function signifies that the errors are not substantial and, thus, the model,
theoretically, will perform similarly when exposed to unseen data.
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It is important to note that the standard MSE value is computed only on the
training dataset (the data for which the model was fitted on) and is, therefore,
referenced as the training MSE. This value is of little practical importance as it is
merely representative of the past predictive accuracy; we are more concerned about
how well the model performs given values of new unseen data. This is known as
generalisation performance. Given a new prediction value x0 and a true response
y0, we look to take the expectation across all such new prediction values, giving
us the test MSE :
MSEtest :=E
[
(y0 − fˆ(x0))
2
]
(16)
Where the expectation is taken across all unseen predictive pairs (y0, x0). The
objective is to select the model that yields the lowest MSE. To do this, we can
increase the flexibility of the model (the degrees of freedom available to the model
to fit to the training dataset). In this regard, a linear model is very inflexible (it
only has 2 degrees of freedom), whereas a polynomial is highly flexible (it can have
many degrees of freedom).
However, if the loss function is minimised too severely, then generalisation perfor-
mance of the model can decrease substantially. This is a major known concern
and is referred to as the bias-variance trade-off – indicating that the model has
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been over-fit to the training data, and has not learned the general form of the re-
sponse function. Whilst increasing the degrees of freedom helps the model adapt
to more complex datasets, it is extremely important to recognise that there is an
increased likelihood of over-fitting, and a clear warning that the model is more
closely aligned to minor variations in the training input set (noise) than any un-
derlying true signal.
A technique to mitigate the effects of the bias-variance trade-off is to use a separate
validation dataset (different from training data) by randomly dividing observations
in two partitions - in-sample (used for model training) and out-of-sample (used
to examine the predictive estimates against the true values) sets. However, if we
don’t have a separate set of reference out-of-sample data, we can adopt a technique
known as cross-validation (CV). In the current study we make use of a specific
implementation of CV known as k-Fold cross validation. k -Fold seeks to divide n
observations of the data into k mutually exclusive and approximately equal sized
folds (subsets). This is repeated k times, with each iteration holding out a fold as
a validation set, whilst the remaining k − 1 are left for training. This permits us
to calculate an overall estimate CVk, giving us the average of all individuals mean
squared errors, MSEi. More formally, CVk is defined as follows:
CVk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
MSEi (17)
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Due to computational expenses, the optimal value for k has been empirically
proven to be k = 5 or k = 10.
Figure 3: Schematic of 5-fold cross validation (Murphy, 2012).
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4 Empirical Study
In this section, we define the methodology for the price impact analysis, while
simultaneously introducing several key properties that are relevant to our investi-
gation. In the earlier background and literature review section, we have discussed
several popular market impact models such as the linear Kyle model and Square
Root empirical functional form. Here, we develop a further understanding of price
dynamics by exploring the functional relationships between change in price (im-
pact) and state of the world before and after.
Please note that the data used for our statistical analysis has been pre-processed
to remove outliers. We further reconstruct original MOs that are represented as
several LO executions within the LOBSTER dataset. Appendix C.3 describes in
detail the applied pre-processing procedure.
4.1 Modelling Market Impact
In broad terms, price impact can be defined as an incremental change in price
caused by the execution of market buy orders, or a similar drop in price caused
by the sell orders. Statistically, market impact relates to the positive correlation
between the incoming MO sign and the price change that follows immediately, or
sometime after MO execution (Bouchaud et al., 2018).
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Therefore, in our study of price impact, we focus on the consequences of MOs.
We recognise that all kinds of market events may impact prices, but we choose
to concentrate on the effect of MOs because it is conceptually and operationally
intuitive to study initially – i.e., it suffices to use trades and quotes data from the
exchange.
In combination with earlier remarks about submitted order sizes rarely exceeding
available volume at the opposite side best quote (LOBSTER output discussion
in Section 3.2.2), we postulate the following two assumptions of our empirical
analysis:
1. Market orders never exceed available liquidity in the market
2. Impact of arrivals and cancellations of LOs can be neglected
These assumptions will help us understand the high-level dynamics of interactions
in the marketplace without introducing unnecessary complexity to the decision-
making process.
With this in mind, we can begin to measure the impact of trades on prices.
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4.1.1 Unconditional Lag-1 Impact
Bouchaud et al. (2003) in their paper “Fluctuations and response in financial
markets: the subtle nature of ‘random’ price changes” postulate that the simplest
quantity, that can assist in the study of price changes, is the mean squared fluc-
tuation of the prices between the given trade and the execution of the next one
(correspondent to the execution of MOs in the context of LOB trading). They
functionally define this degree of fluctuation D (l) as:
D (l) :=〈(mt+1 −mt)〉 (18)
Where mt is the mid-price immediately before the t
th MO:
m (t) :=
1
2
(a (t) + b (t)) (19)
a (t) and b (t) are the corresponding ask and bid prices.
Whilst D (l) measures the degree of diffusive behaviour of market prices, authors
propose a better alternative to examine specifically the effect of trading on the
change in prices - lagged response function R(). R(1) is the lagged by 1 response
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function that measures the average difference between the mid-price just before
the arrival of an original MO and the mid-price just before the arrival of the next
MO:
R(1):=〈εt · (mt+1 −mt)〉t, (20)
In contrast to the previous diffusion estimation, the response function includes the
order sign εt to account for the direction of MO. For instance, if a market sell
order (direction -1) causes an asset price to decrease, the change in mid-price will
be negative. To compensate for this, we incorporate the order sign -1 (given by εt).
This allows the correct estimation of correlation between MO and subsequent price
change. Specifically, R (1) measures how much, on average, the price increases
given a buy order (or how sell order moves the price down).
The lag-1 response is calculated as the empirical average of R (1) over all consec-
utive MOs. This definition can be further extended to look at the relationship
of MOs beyond lag-1; or conditioned on extra variables. However, initially, we
explore the statistical properties of R (1) as defined above.
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Order Splitting
Lag-1 response function measures market reaction to a single MO. In reality,
traders wishing to execute large quantities have to split their orders into child
MO to reduce the impact by matching available liquidity at the corresponding
price level (please see Appendix B.1 for more detail). To study the dynamics of
such meta-orders, it is necessary to know which child orders belong to the same
meta-order. Such levels of information can only be found in specialised and/ or
proprietary data sets. Due to such restrictions, this paper solely focuses on the
impact of single independent MOs.
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4.1.2 Engineering Response Function
We calculate the lag-1 response function for each of our four stocks during the first
6 months of 2015 using uncond market impact.py script provided in the Appendix
E. The general idea is demonstrated in algorithm 1 below:
Algorithm 1: Calculate lag-1 response
Input: A DataFrame set of trades and quotes entries D = {d1, d2, . . . , dr}, where
∀t : dt entry contains the following information about the market event:
{Time,EventTypeCode,OrderID, V olume, Price,
Direction,AskPrice, AskV olume,BidPrice,BidV olume,
Mid− price, Spread}
Output: 〈s〉, R(1),Σr, NMO
1 〈s〉, R(1),Σr, NMO ← 0
2 mt,mt+1, V (1)← 0
3 for i = 0, . . . , length (D) do
4 if di[EventType] = 4 or di[EventType] = 5 then
5 NMO+ = 1
6 〈s〉+ = di−1[Ask]− di−1[Bid]
7 if mt = 0 then
8 mt = di[Midprice]
9 mt+1 = di+1[Midprice]
10 R = max (0, (mt+1 −mt) ∗ sign)
11 R(1)+ = R
12 V (1)+ = (mt+1 −mt)2
13 mt = mt+1
14 〈s〉 = 〈s〉/NMO
15 R(1) = R(1)/NMO
16 V (1) = V (1)/(NMO
17 Σr =
√
V (1)−R(1)2
18 return 〈s〉, R(1),Σr, NMO
In addition to R (1) the script estimates:
• 〈s〉 - average spread just before a MO
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• ∑R - standard deviation of price fluctuations around the average price im-
pact of a MO
• NMO – number of MOs recorded during the day (excluding the auctions)
A MO is said to be price-changing if its size is equal to or exceeds the volume at
corresponding opposite-side best price in the LOB at the time of MO arrival; that
is, MO execution changes the current price of an asset immediately to the next
best bid (ask) respectively.
In summary, the above algorithmic procedure iterates over daily market events
and when it finds a MO execution (corresponding to the event of type 4 or 5),
it records various statistics. Appendix C.8 explains specifically how the events of
type 5 – execution of hidden orders - can affect our measurement of market impact.
For each trading days’ set of observations we calculate daily averages, and then
use it to estimate descriptive statistics of our data for the entire period.
59
4.1.3 Empirical Observations
The results of our calculations can be found in the below Table 6:
Stock 〈s〉 R (1) ∑R NMO
SIRI 1.09 0.027 0.138 589
EBAY 1.10 0.384 0.536 3802
TSLA 10.82 2.05 3.636 3834
PCLN 75.53 10.09 21.129 1409
Table 6: 〈s〉 Average spread; R (1) the lag-1 response function for all MOs; ∑R
standard deviation of price fluctuations around the average price impact of MOs
– all expressed in dollar cents; NMO total average number of MO per day between
10:30 and 15:00 on each trading day from 2nd of January to 30th of June 2015 for
four large- and small- tick stocks.
The following can be noted:
• Lag-1 unconditional response R (1) is strongly positive for all stocks. This
implies that on average, MOs are followed by a change in price.
• For small tick stocks TSLA and PCLN, R (1) seems proportional to the
average spread 〈s〉. This could be explained by our earlier discussion of
market makers’ compensation for adverse selection – MMs attempt to earn
the bid-ask spread but are challenged by adverse price movement caused by
the MOs impact.
• For large tick stocks, the spread is bound below by (and is often equal to) a
single tick as can be noticed for SIRI and EBAY. When the bid-ask spread is
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this small, neither of the best prices can improve as the two would otherwise
merge. If we recall Figure 1 from the earlier discussion of the LOB, there was
a gap of 4 ticks between the best ask and bid prices. In that case, submission
of a new LO at a price lower than the current ask would update the best
quote, thus the mid-price. Large tick stocks, on the other hand, do not have
such a gap between the best bid and ask, therefore, the changes in mid-price
are not affected by LOs in the same manner. In this regard, Bonart and
Gould (2017) argue that large tick stocks are more suited for the analyses of
price queue dynamics.
• For all stocks, the degree of dispersion ∑R exceeds the mean impact R (1),
meaning that R (1) varies greatly. This is due to the fact that, as we have
observed from the data, MOs can not only change the price in the direction
of demand, but have also been found, at times, to not affect the LOB at
all. Moreover, a MO can be followed by the opposite direction change in the
mid-price. In this respect, R (1) incorporates the effect of the full sequence
of market events that have caused the asset price to change including sub-
missions and cancellations of LOs. As pointed out earlier, small tick stocks’
mid-prices are prone to be affected by LOs to a larger degree than large-tick
stocks.
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4.1.4 2015 Financial Time Series
Our choice of the observational period was partially influenced by the research of
Bouchaud et al. (2018). Authors use LOBSTER data for 120 stocks traded on
NASDAQ to measure and predict market impact. They have conducted compa-
rable estimations for our selected securities during 2015.
When we initially benchmarked our findings for the first six months of 2015 to those
of Bouchaud et al. (2018), our response function measurements were somewhat
lesser. To understand this phenomenon, we conducted the same experiments on the
dataset for the second half of 2015 (to obtain an entire year average as estimated
in Bouchaud et al. (2018)).
The results, presented in Table 7, indicate that trade activity in the second half of
2015 was very distinct from the first six months. This is in line with several public
news archives, which report major financial events that took place at the start of
June 2015 and followed through to June 2016. During that period, now referred
to as “2015-16 stock market sell-off”, stock prices around the world declined in
value as traders were actively selling for a number of reasons including: slowing
growth of Chinese GDP, falling petroleum prices, Greek debt default, sharp rise in
bond yields and UK’s decision to leave the European Union among other factors
(Randall and Gaffen, 2016).
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Stock 〈s〉 R (1) ∑R NMO
SIRI 1.04 0.031 0.156 669
EBAY 1.10 0.263 0.470 3320
TSLA 15.05 2.568 4.984 4007
PCLN 113.17 14.353 32.088 1273
Table 7: 〈s〉 Average spread; R (1) the lag-1 response function for all MOs; ∑R
standard deviation of price fluctuations around the average price impact of MOs
– all expressed in dollar cents; NMO total average number of MO per day between
10:30 and 15:00 on each trading day from 30th of June to 31st of December 2015
for four large- and small- tick stocks
The data adheres to the occurrence of such events – the average spread and price
dispersion (as measured by the standard deviation) are evidently higher for the
period of June to December 2015 (higher than the first half). Although the fol-
lowing year of 2016 is out of the scope of our research, we are confident similar
trend continued through.
When we average the outcome for the two halves of 2015, our results resemble
closely those by Bouchaud et al. (2018). Table 8 contrasts our findings to those
outlined in “Trades, Quotes and Prices” (Bouchaud et al., 2018).
We prescribe some minor discrepancy in the reported results to the implementation
approach. Some further discussion on this is presented in Appendix C.9.
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Stock 〈s〉 R (1) ∑R NMO
SIRI 1.06 0.058 0.213 623
SIRI* 1.06 0.029 0.147 629
EBAY 1.10 0.348 0.502 3575
EBAY* 1.10 0.324 0.503 3561
TSLA 12.99 2.59 4.49 3932
TSLA* 12.94 2.31 4.31 3921
PCLN 94.68 15.30 28.77 1342
PCLN* 94.35 12.22 26.61 1341
Table 8: In bold are empirical observations from the work of Bouchaud et al.
(2018); in white results of the current study using market data from LOBSTER
(measurement units are the same as in Tables 6 and 7)
4.1.5 Conditioning on Trade Volume
In our earlier discussion of market impact, we looked at several economic reasons
that drive this phenomenon – MOs revealing private information and MOs’ me-
chanical consumption of available liquidity – both leading to the change in the
best-quoted price (immediate or subsequent). It is, thus, intuitive to explore a re-
lationship of how the size of MO can influence the degree of impact. Therefore, we
define R (υ, 1) as a volume dependent lag-1 impact response function and further
explore its’ functional form.
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Feature Engineering: Extraction and Selection
In this respect, our feature selection process throughout the study has been guided
by economic intuition. That is, following a comprehensive study of subject liter-
ature we have identified features that we believe can help explain market impact;
as opposed to obtaining the inferred relationships between the price impact and
various observed market variables using feature extraction techniques.
To arrive at a point where we can examine the impact response function, we have
also engineered several features such as mid-price, spread, the standard deviation
of price fluctuations, normalised trade volume and the response function itself.
Whilst the former features are not going to be used directly for defining price
impacts functional form, quantities like spread and standard deviation illustrate
important qualities of our dataset which we highlighted in the previous section.
Normalised Volume
To account for daily trends and to be able to compare response function behaviour
among stock with different average traded volume characteristics, we normalise
the MO volume υ by the average volume at the opposite side best quote V¯best.
The mean volume used for normalisation is recalculated each day ensuring the
robustness of the relative scale.
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Descriptive Statistics
For this exercise, we recorded the normalised volume of each MO and its cor-
responding lag-1 response function R (1). As a part of data pre-processing, we
have removed outliers and aggregated average response per observed values of
normalised volume. Jupyter Notebook (document that illustrates the code and its
execution) Conditioning on Trade Volume in Appendix E describes the detailed
procedure.
An initial analysis of distribution of normalised volume, showed that the major-
ity of trades for both large tick EBAY and small tick PCLN have a relatively
small normalised volume (example in Figure 4). This means we have many more
observations for smaller trade volumes than for trades of a larger size.
To regularise the data, we ordered the series by normalised volume and then split
the dataset in two: trades with normalised volume less than 0.1 and the rest of
observations. Then we subsampled each partition at different frequencies.
Subsampling
The LOBSTER data represents the evolution of the LOB throughout each trading
day sampled by the arrival of new events, as opposed to sampling at regular time
intervals. In our study, we are similarly interested in the series of events as they
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Figure 4: Normalised volume distribution for PCLN. Yellow line representing the
mean normilised volume.
arrive in the exchange, and more specifically MO executions.
In our initial analysis of market data, we conducted several data subsampling
experiments where we regularised time series by sampling at regular intervals in
several feature spaces. The main purpose of subsampling is to transform a series
of observations that arrive at irregular intervals (such as LOBSTER data) into
a homogeneous series. Such form is akin to a tabular representation and is often
referred to as bars. In the Jupyter Notebook Create Bars (see Appendix E) several
standard bars are created including time, tick, volume and dollar bars. Volume
bars, for example, sample data every time a certain threshold (number of shares)
of the security has been exchanged. Similarly, other types of bars sample daily
market data at regular intervals in tick, time and dollar dimensions.
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To estimate the relationship between response function and trade volume, how-
ever, we examine every market order – its corresponding normalised volume and
lag-1 response. Therefore, a slightly different kind of regularisation applies in this
case: for trades with smaller trade volume we sample the data every 0.01 increment
in the (ordered) series of normalised volume; for larger volume trades we sample
the data every 0.1 increment in normalised volume observation. This approach
to regularisation allows us to normalise the dataset according to the density of
observations. An exact procedure is demonstrated in the Jupyter Notebook Con-
ditioning on Trade Volume which shows how we have visualised lag-1 response
function conditioned on normalised trade volume (we collected the data during
execution of uncond market impact.py – available in Appendix E).
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Lag-1 Response Function Conditioned on Normalised Trade Volume
From our earlier discussions it was intuitive to assume that larger MOs would
affect the price more than smaller MOs. However, the empirical results in Figure
5 demonstrate that the effect of trade volume on the price is very faint: small tick
stock PCLN exhibits almost constant monotonic relationship between normalised
trade volume and the price impact (as measured by R (υ , 1)); whilst large tick
stock EBAY illustrates some functional dependency for small volumes but it dilutes
and becomes monotonous as the normalised volume increases.
Figure 5: Lag-1 Response Function Conditioned on Normalised Trade Volume
for PCLN (left) and EBAY (right)
From this visual representation of lag-1 impact conditioned on the trade volume we
note that the response function appears to be concave and even almost constant
for small tick stocks such as PCLN. It would be necessary, however, to compare
observations for a larger number of securities to confirm the robustness of such
findings. We refer to the works of Bouchaud et al. (2018) and Zarinell et al. (2015)
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who obtained similar results. The former attribute concavity to a conditioning
bias called selective liquidity taking. Appendix B.1 elaborates further on this
phenomenon.
4.1.6 Order-Flow Imbalance
An alternative approach to measuring impact of trades on price is to observe
market impact not at trade-by-trade level, as we were doing before, but instead at
aggregated order-flow scale. In other words, in contrast to looking at the individual
impact of trades, we aggregate multiple MOs’ signed volumes as a single order-
flow imbalance and measure how the price has changed before and after. Recall ε
as order sign (positive meaning buy MO, and negative – sell MO), and υ as the
volume of an individual MO, we denote order-flow imbalance ∆V as:
∆V =
∑
n∈[t, t+T )
εnυn (21)
where T > 0 tells the effect of how many events (MOs) is measured by ∆V .
In this regard, ∆V indicates the proportions of buy and sell orders that arrive
during a given period (as measured in the number of MOs observed). Positive
∆V means there were more buy orders (in volume) during the specified period
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(buy orders have positive sign and volume causing ∆V > 0 ), therefore the price
is expected to rise (for reasons we have discussed earlier). Contrastingly, negative
∆V implies more recent sell orders, hence the price is expected to decline. We
further study the aggregate impact conditioned on this volume imbalance, defined
as:
R(∆V, T ) := E[mt+T −mt|∆V ] (22)
R(∆V, T ) measures change in the mid-price immediately before the original MO
and after a sequence of T MOs (mt+T being a mid-price immediately before the
next MO after T MOs).
Aggregate Response Function Conditioned on Trade-Flow Imbalance
We choose to investigate the relationship between aggregate impact (measured
in dollar cents) and the order-flow imbalance (measured in shares) over T =
5, 10, 20, 50 for TSLA stock. Our approach is demonstrated in the Jupyter
Notebook Conditioning on Order-Flow Imbalance in Appendix E.
In this part of the study we did not normalise (by corresponding average daily
statistics, as done in the previous section when conditioning on trade volume) ag-
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Figure 6: Aggregate impact (in dollar cents) of order-flow imbalance (in shares)
(in over T=5 (top left), T=10 (top right), T=20 (bottom left) and T=50 (bottom
right) for TSLA stock
gregate impact or imbalance, therefore, each experiments’ results are presented in
individual subplot. The main purpose of this exercise was to visually understand
the functional form of relationship between order-flow imbalance and the aggre-
gated price response function. The following interesting properties can be noticed
from Figure 6:
• Imbalance amplitude increases with T – as we aggregate the effect of more
trades, the order-flow imbalance increases in absolute value as well. For
instance, when observing the impact of T = 5 MOs, imbalance ranges from
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around -1500 to 1500 shares. However, once T is increased to 10, imbalance
scope expands to reaching 6000 shares in absolute value. Interestingly, the
functional form of relationship seems the same for all T despite different
scales.
• For smaller ∆V the relationship with R(∆V, T ) appears to be linear for all
observed T = 5, 10, 20, 50.
• With increase in |∆V | (absolute value of order-flow imbalance) the relation-
ship takes on a more concave (rather than linear) form, similar to our pre-
vious analysis of lag-1 response function conditioned on normalised volume.
Again, this may be attributed to the selective liquidity bias, as described in
Appendix B.1.
4.2 Results
In the previous section we stated that the dependency between order-flow imbal-
ance and corresponding aggregate price impact appears linear for smaller absolute
values of ∆V . In this segment, we conduct statistical experiments, as outlined in
the research methodology section, to quantitatively infer functional form of mar-
ket impact conditional on order-flow imbalance. Our approach is illustrated in the
Jupyter Notebook Market Impact Functional Form in Appendix E.
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4.2.1 Functional Form of Market Impact
Descriptive Statistics
We use the data collected for TSLA stock over the entire year of 2015 with order-
flow imbalance observed over T = 10 MOs with the total of 47,473 observations
of ∆V and R(∆V, T ). We remove the outliers beyond 3 standard deviations and
subsample the data to reduce the noise. Visually our dataset is described by Figure
7. We also illustrate the distributions of R(∆V, T ) – aggregate impact, and ∆V –
order-flow imbalance in Figure 8.
Figure 7: Aggregate impact (in dollar cents) conditioned on order-flow imbalance
(in shares) for TSLA stock during 2015 after data pre-processing
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Figure 8: Aggregate impact (in dollar cents) and order-flow imbalance (in shares)
distributions for TSLA during 2015. Red lines representing means - for aggregate
response two lines are positive and negative means.
These are in accordance with the previous illustration – imbalance distribution is
uniform, meaning that asymmetry (order-flow imbalance) of every size on either
direction of trade is equally likely. Aggregate impact, on the other hand, seems to
have more observations for a specific absolute value of around 10 dollar cents. This
concentration of aggregated price impact, again, can be explained by the selective
liquidity bias - larger orders (therefore order-flow imbalance) only consume the
liquidity available at the best opposite-side quote, hence, the impact does not
increase beyond certain margin (is concave).
We further explore the correlation between the two observed variables and calculate
the correlation coefficient ρ = 0.8538 which indicates a strong positive relationship
between order-flow and price impact (i.e., the greater the imbalance the bigger the
market impact).
The summary of other statistics for order-flow imbalance and aggregate impact is
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presented in Appendix C - Table 9.
Supervised Linear Regression
We first estimate functional relationship between ∆V and R(∆V, T ) using a Linear
Regression model which employs the OLS approach.
We split our dataset randomly into two partitions: the training data to fit the
model, and the test data reserved to verify predictive accuracy of our model on
unseen data. To quantify this accuracy, Mean Squared Error (MSE) is calcu-
lated to assess how values estimated by the regression model differ from the true
observations in the test dataset.
In the case of Linear Regression, the MSE is 3.86 meaning that, on average, our
predicted aggregated price impact was either above or below the true value by 3.86
dollar cents. We graphically illustrate predictive linear model and true observations
in the Figure 9.
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Decision Tree
As an alternative to Linear Regression, we estimate a model using Decision Tree
Regression – a supervised learning technique that predicts values of regressand by
learning decision rules derived from observations. In contrast to Linear Regres-
sion, Decision Tree model is not linear in parameters, therefore, it utilises MLE
for parameter estimation. Similarly, we train our model on one partition of the
data and test it on another unseen dataset. The MSE for Decision Tree model
is 2.5 dollar cents – a better estimate than Linear Regression model. A visual
representation of predicted and observed values can be seen in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Linear Regression model and true observations of market impact for
TSLA (left). Decision Tree model and true observations of market impact for
TSLA (right) (Decision Tree Regression only displaying testing observations).
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Cross-Validation: Model Selection
Splitting the dataset into two partitions – one for training and one for testing – is
a na¨ıve approach to testing predicting accuracy. Thus, we employ cross-validation
to determine which model produces better estimates.
Cross-validation is conducted using a helper function that splits the data into
training and test sets, fits the model and calculates scores (MSE and R2 in our
case) for a number of consecutive runs. We perform cross-validation using 10
partitions on both models. Figure 10 demonstrate MSEs and R2 coefficients for
Linear Regression and Decision Tree Regression (Table 11 in Appendix C shows
the exact details).
Figure 10: MSE (left) with average MSE for Linear Regression in blue, and
average MSE for Decision Tree Regression in green; and R2 results (right) for
Linear Regression and Decision Tree Regression.
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From the two figures it is evident that the Decision Tree Regression displayed
better predictive performance - its average MSE is slightly lower than MSE of
Linear Regression model; and the coefficient R2 (proportion of variance in the ob-
served data that is explained by the estimated model) is higher for Decision Tree
regression as well. However, the results of cross-validation illustrate that Decision
Tree Regression does not always produce more accurate predictions. Despite this,
we strongly believe the performance of ML algorithm could be improved in fu-
ture studies by exploring various other features, learning models and tuning the
parameters.
4.2.2 Kyle’s Lambda
The functional linearity between price impact and order-flow imbalance is an em-
pirical illustration of Kyle’s model which was introduced in the earlier Literature
Review chapter. As we recall, Kyle stated that the price adjustment must be linear
in total signed volume, expressed as:
∆p = λεV (23)
Therefore, the slope of linear relationship that we have observed for smaller volume
imbalances is, what’s known as, a Kyle’s lambda.
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Model Estimation
In order to estimate the slope of this linear region of R(∆V, T ), we train the model
specifically on the subsection of our observations where the relationship appears
linear (as illustrated in the Figure 11).
Figure 11: Subsection of observation that demonstrate linearity between order-
flow imbalance and price impact for TSLA in 2015.
Again, we use Linear Regression and Decision Tree Regression to fit the model
and cross-validate it. The models and corresponding statistics about prediction
accuracy (MSE and R2) are illustrated in the Figure 12.
In this instance, both models have a good performance according to R2 coefficient
(both Linear and Decision Tree Regressions seem to explain much of the variance in
the observed data); however, Decision Tree Regression model demonstrates much
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Figure 12: Top: models of Linear and Decision Tree Regressions for predicting
market impact conditioned on order-flow imbalance (Decision Tree Regression only
displaying testing observations); bottom: measures of goodness of fit for the two
models (left: green line - average MSE for Decision Tree, blue line - average MSE
for Linear Regression
lower average MSE by almost 0.50 dollar cents. This supports our earlier remark
about the potential for more accurate ML predictive models.
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Measure of Market Liquidity
The slope of our linear model, the Kyle’s λ, was estimated as 0.011. This is
regarded as the measure of (il-)liquidity of a market. For TSLA, we can postulate
that the market is quite liquid, since the value of λ is low. However, for more
robust conclusions it is necessary to compare measurements of λ across multiple
stocks and venues.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Summary
The focus of this research was to find a functional form of market impact using
parametric machine learning algorithms. We began with an overview of the finan-
cial market microstructure and the role of information (and more importantly in-
formation asymmetry) in the price formation (discovery) process. We then looked
at a number of models of the information efficiency in the market, and how agents’
interactions influence trading. Naturally we arrived at the definition of market im-
pact - the focal point of this study.
Following suit, we used trades and quotes dataset from NASDAQ electronic ex-
change to measure unconditional market impact, price impact conditioned on
normilised trade volume and the aggregate price response as a function of order-
flow imbalance. We have learnt that the unconditional price impact of market
orders is proportional to the average spread for the stock. Moreover, we observed
no functional dependency between price response function and normilised trade
volume - partially attributed to the selective liquidity bias. In our analysis of aggre-
gate price impact conditioned on the order-flow imbalance, we discerned sublinear
relationship between these two observed variables.
Consequently, we employed Linear Regression and Decision Tree Regression models
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to quantitatively measure the functional form of such relationship. We used the
two models to predict values of aggregated price impact of order-flow imbalance
after a number of consecutive market orders. Decision Tree Regression - a machine
learning algorithm that is not linear in parameters, illustrated better predictive
accuracy than traditional Linear Regression, during cross-validation.
5.2 Future Work
We identify a number of ways in which our study can be further developed. The
below list provides a summary of our suggestions. These are further explained in
the Appendix D.
• To explore the statistical and practical application of ML models in estima-
tion of market impact it would be necessary to conduct a comparison with
performance of current standard (for academics and practitioners) measures
of price impact (i.e., Volume Weighted Average Price, VWAP); as well as
other theoretical and empirical formulas of market impact.
• Alternative data sources can be used for study of the impact of meta-orders
(see Appendix D.1.1).
• It would be of acute importance to study liquidity dynamics and impact of
trades in illiquid markets - for example, in stressed market conditions (see
Appendix D.1.2).
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• Furthermore, the study can be expanded to other financial products (not
just equities) (see Appendix D.1.3).
• Accurate measure of liquidity (thus market impact) facilitates the under-
standing of optimal execution, further contributing to the study of optimal
trading strategies (see Appendix D.1.4).
• Experimental part of this research has been computationally intensive - it
would be beneficial to adopt high-performance computational resources when
analysing high-frequency data (see Appendix D.1.5).
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Appendices
A
A.1 Market and Funding Liquidity
As outlined by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the market and funding liq-
uidity concepts are mutually reinforcing. Traders provide market liquidity, and
their ability to do so is dependent on the availability of funds. Conversely, traders
funding needs, such as margin and capital requirements (i.e., collateral needed to
enter into a trade) depend on the market liquidity of the asset. More accurately,
when funding liquidity becomes scarce, traders become reluctant to take on capital
intensive positions, lowering market liquidity and increasing margin and capital
requirements. This increased risk, and thus cost of financing a trade (margin or
haircut) is thus dependent on efficient streams of market liquidity.
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BB.1 Selective Liquidity Taking Under Market Fragmen-
tation
An imperative consequence of information asymmetry that is crucial to under-
standing of how markets operate is that even highly liquid markets are in fact
not sufficiently liquid after all Bouchaud et al. (2018). That is, to minimise the
risk of adverse selection, MMs providing liquidity operate in a regime of small re-
vealed liquidity, and large latent liquidity. Consequently, the available liquidity at
any given moment only reflects a small fraction of the potentially huge underlying
supply and demand. This is often captured by general equilibrium models such
as Kyle (1985), Mastromatteo, Toth and Bouchaud (2014), which are based on
interactions between rational agents who take optimal decisions.
The scarcity of liquidity has an immediate and important consequence: large
trades, or meta-orders, must be fragmented into smaller child orders that can
be slowly digested by markets. Empirical observations such as Bouchaud (2009)
suggest that order splitting is a very common practice in a wide range of markets.
In recent years, it has become common to trade assets on several different electronic
platforms simultaneously. This increased fragmentation means it is necessary to
split an order not just through time, but also through space - to selectively consume
93
liquidity (submit trades no larger than the available liquidity at the corresponding
price) across all available venues (Lehalle and Laruelle, 2018).
In the earlier discussions of functional form of relationship between response func-
tion and normalised volume, as well as, dependency of aggregate impact on order-
flow imbalance, we have attributed concavity to selective liquidity taking. This
could be partially explained by the fact that the larger orders arrive only when
there is a large volume available at the opposite side best quote. In other words,
larger volume trades do not cause bigger impact because they only consume avail-
able liquidity and no more. Therefore, the price impact remains monotonic (con-
cave) for different size trades.
The study of meta-orders and hidden orders (hidden in the sense that the true
order size is not made public to minimize information leakage) yields surprising
empirical findings for the functional form of market impact. However, the existing
empirical literature on the subject is limited, with Torre (1997), Almgren (2003),
Moro et al. (2009), being the few publications in this area. This is attributed to
the difficulty in obtaining access to data that could facilitate statistical reconstruc-
tion of transactions against trading account member codes. This would otherwise
permit us to identify the parent meta-orders to which a child belongs to. The
limitation of our study stems from this lack of proprietary datasets which clearly
identifies the source of large orders. For this reason, latent liquidity and the impact
of meta-orders are beyond the scope of this project.
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Figure 13: Latent Order Book in the presence of a meta-order, with bid orders
(blue boxes) and ask orders (red boxes) sitting on opposite sides of the price line
and subject to a stochastic evolution. (DONIER, Jonathan et al., 2015)
B.2 Limit Orderbooks and Their Models
The LOB keeps a record of order-flow events – the execution of trades (aggres-
sive market orders) and the provision of liquidity (passive limit orders). These
orders are managed by a matching engine in accordance with some well-defined
algorithm (i.e., price time priority or pro-rata rules). The unusually rich, detailed,
and high-quality historic LOB data facilitates the ability to analyse complex global
phenomena that emerge as a result of the local interactions between many hetero-
geneous agents.
The earliest models of LOB generally depicted the evolution of order flow according
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to simple stochastic processes with set parameters. Smith et al. (2003) introduced
a model in which limit order queues, as well as counter executed market orders
and cancellations, transpire as mutually exclusive Poisson processes with fixed-
rate parameters. The model has since been extended by Cont, Stoikov and Talreja
(2010), who account for varying cancellation and limit order rates as a function of
fluctuating prices.
Though these so-called zero intelligence models (models in which order flows are
assumed to be governed by specified stochastic processes) of LOBs perform rela-
tively well at depicting some long-run statistical properties of genuine LOBs (see,
e.g., Farmer, Patelli and Zovko (2005)); they are largely hindered by their ex-
clusion of strategic considerations in which liquidity providers might adapt their
flows in response to the actions of others. This constraint was recently allevi-
ated in the work of Huang, Lehalle and Rosenbaum (2015). By incorporating an
agent’s strategic behaviour, they provide a more realistic picture of empirically
observed facts about the price discovery and price formation processes, as well as,
the general market quality.
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CC.1 The NASDAQ
NASDAQ stands for “National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quo-
tation” and was originally founded in 1971 in New York, USA. The initial idea
behind NASDAQ stock exchange was to give dealers the ability to post quotes
electronically, thus making the process of selling smaller stocks (previously sold
OTC) more efficient. This electrification of the trading process proved hugely
successful. Today NASDAQ is the second-largest electronic exchange by market
capitalisation in the world - currently exceeding 10 trillion US dollars. And the
first by overall trading volume.
Unlike other major exchanges such as NYSE, NASDAQ does not have a physical
location – it is an entirely digital marketplace. NASDAQ normal trading hours
are between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm Eastern Time on a business day. Typically,
NASDAQ operates around 253 days a year.
C.2 Ordeerbook Reconstruction
The order book dynamics are simulated by continuously updating known informa-
tion about its state. For example, given the previous day state of LOB for a stock,
each new TotalView-ITCH event message changes the state of the book according
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to whether the message was an addition, update, cancellation or execution of the
limit order. Figure 14 illustrates the incoming message “A” to add a limit order.
In response, a new order is added to the pool and the LOB is updated at the cor-
responding price level. In contrast, when an update message arrives – for example,
cancellation “X” and “D”, the original order is found in the pool using order ID
and updated accordingly.
Figure 14: LOB reconstruction from NASDAQ data feed (HUANG, Ruihong
and Polak, Tomas, 2011)
For each LOBSTER data request, the LOB is reconstructed fully from the ex-
change message data for the stock during the specified period. By choosing an
appropriate level of depth, only the number of levels requested is saved to the
output file.
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LOBSTER data has been widely popular among academics in recent years. We
find studies of Bouchaud et al. (2018), Cartea, Jaimungal and Penalva (2015),
Bonart and Gould (2017) and others using LOBSTER data for microstructure
research. The pre-processed output LOB files are available to download via the
Internet saving a lot of time and effort, thus enabling academics to focus on the
economic study.
C.3 Data Prepossessing
Python Data Analysis
Once the data is downloaded from LOBSTER in CSV format, we define and deploy
Python script to analyse and clean the data. Since each record in LOBSTER
message file corresponds to exactly one record in orderbook file (and both files
are ordered), we merge the data from messages and orderbook into one Python
DataFrame object to be able to manipulate and analyse the data more efficiently.
DataFrame is a two-dimensional tabular data structure with labelled rows and
columns that can store data of various types - integer numbers, floating-point
numbers, string characters and other. Throughout our empirical study we operate
on market data using Python, and more specifically Python Pandas library which
contains an extensive number of data science methods and functions implemented
and available freely for use by academics and practitioners. Python has become
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very popular and is increasingly recognised as the de-facto data science language
among both in recent years because of it’s easy to read (thus use) syntax and
multi-paradigm nature.
Inspection and Cleaning
To begin with, we investigate the properties of typical daily data. Our research
objective is to define how various environment features, such as trade volume,
influence the parameter of interest – market impact. To achieve this, we estimate
the daily impact of MOs, and then calculate an average price impact for the total
6 months set of observations (amounting to 248 trading days).
When looking at the average daily data, we discover that a large portion of
events during trading hours constitute submission and cancellation of LOs (events
of type 1 and 3 respectively). These findings, illustrated in Figure 15, are aligned
with previous microstructure research (see Bouchaud et al. (2018)). Therefore,
given our particular interest in how executions of MOs influence the price, only
a small fraction of a daily dataset is relevant for the purposes of our quantitative
analysis. To compensate for this, the study examines daily dynamics throughout
a sufficiently long period of 6 months.
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Figure 15: Frequencies of market events of each type during trading day.
Next, when we examine the average trade volume for TSLA, some very unusual
values are evident (Figure 16). Most electronic markets are known to operate
during set time intervals throughout the day, where the beginning and end of
the day are more generally reserved for auctions that result in the atypical trade
activity. This might explain our findings of trade volume outliers.
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Figure 16: Box plot of trade volumes during the full trading day for TSLA stock
For each trading day, we remove the market activity for the first and the last hour,
e.g. only using data for 10:30-15:00. This eliminates some inconsistency noticed
in the previous examination of trade volume range as per Figure 17.
Figure 17: Box plot of trade volumes during 10:30-15:00 for TSLA stock
At this point, it is important to consider that whenever a single MO matches
several LOs in the book, each LO execution is listed as a separate record in both
LOBSTER messages and orderbook files, albeit with the same timestamp. An
example is illustrated in Table 9 where three consecutive executions of visible LOs
(event type 4) have the same timestamp, therefore, represent a single MO being
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matched with several LOs at that price. Interestingly, the execution of the last
LO at the best ask price consumes all available liquidity at that level (33 shares)
thus moving the ask price to the next best level – from 2058500 to 2058800. The
next arriving MO to buy is most likely to be executed at this new price. This is an
example of market impact, therefore, in our study, it is necessary to recognise that
such multiple executions with the same timestamp correspond to a single MO.
And the fact that it is the aggregated MO size that may have caused the price
change, not just the latest matched LO that absorbed liquidity at the best quote.
103
T
im
es
ta
m
p
E
ve
n
t
T
y
p
e
O
rd
er
ID
S
iz
e
D
ir
ec
ti
on
A
sk
P
ri
ce
A
sk
V
ol
u
m
e
37
83
7.
04
74
1
70
92
04
03
10
0
-1
20
58
50
0
10
0
3
7
8
3
7
.0
4
7
4
4
7
0
9
2
0
4
0
3
2
2
-1
2
0
5
8
5
0
0
7
8
3
7
8
3
7
.0
4
7
4
4
7
0
9
2
0
4
0
3
4
5
-1
2
0
5
8
5
0
0
3
3
3
7
8
3
7
.0
4
7
4
4
7
0
9
2
0
4
0
3
33
-1
20
58
80
0
69
3
7
8
3
7
.0
4
7
9
3
7
0
9
2
0
3
8
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
5
8
8
0
0
6
9
37
83
7.
04
79
1
70
92
04
20
10
0
1
20
58
80
0
69
T
a
b
le
9
:
S
ep
ar
at
e
L
O
ex
ec
u
ti
on
s
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
th
e
sa
m
e
M
O
at
th
e
sa
m
e
ti
m
es
ta
m
p
104
Consequently, we group LO executions that happened at exactly the same time,
and aggregate individual LO volumes to reconstruct the size of the original MO.
C.4 Machine Learning
Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning describes a set of algorithms that do not make use of labelled
responses associated with the data. They alternatively exploit the underlying data
structure to draw inference. In this respect, there are no correct target variables,
instead, we are only given inputs, D = {xi}Ni=1, to deduce meaningful properties of
the probability density of the dataset (given no training sample). This is sometimes
referred to as knowledge discovery and is a much less well-defined problem as there
is no means of evaluating the learners’ performance given no obvious target metric.
Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning constitutes the third class of ML. Reinforcement Learning
(RL) attempts to learn a policy of how to take actions in a dynamic environment
to maximise the discounted future reward criterion. To collect information the
learner agent actively interacts with the environment (exploring unknown actions
to gain new insight and exploiting the information already collated) and in some
cases affects the system.
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Parametric and Non-Parametric Models
• Parametric statistical learning involves a specified model of form f(y) with
fixed a fixed number of parameters that define its behaviour. The canonical
example of a parametric model is that of linear regression. This involves
estimation of a set of p+1 coefficients relating to the vector β = (β0, β1, . . . βp)
whereby a response y is linearly proportional to each feature xj. Parametric
models hold the advantage of being efficient in use, but the disadvantage
of making strong assumptions about the nature of the distribution of the
dataset.
• An alternative is to consider a form for f where the number of parameters
grows with respect to the size of the dataset. Non-parametric models may not
involve any parameters or may describe a distribution with a finite number
of parameters. These are more flexible but often computationally intractable
given the large quantity of observational training data required to account for
the lack of assumption. All models considered in this research fall under the
parametric classification. As always, by increasing the number parametric
vectors in our feature space we risk the danger of overfitting the model as
the model may follow the “noise” too closely as opposed to the “signal”.
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C.5 The Gauss–Markov Theorem
To assess the statistical significance of the model and conduct inference, we make
assumptions about the residuals – properties of the unexplained aspect of the input
sample. The Gauss–Markov theorem (GMT) defines several assumptions required
for OLS to generate unbiased estimates of the model parameters β. Under the
standard GMT, the coefficients’ best (optimal) linear unbiased estimator is given
by OLS if and only if:
1. The data for the input variables x, . . . , xk is a random sample from the
population
2. The errors have a conditional mean of zero given any of the inputs:
E[|x, . . . , xk] = 0
3. Homoskedasticity, the error term  has a constant variance given the inputs:
E[|x, . . . , xk] = σ2
The best estimator is the one that yields the lowest standard error (variance) of
the estimates. In addition to these GMT assumptions, the classical linear model
assumes normality – the population error is normally distributed and independent
of the input variables. This implies that the output variables are normally dis-
tributed (conditional on the input variables) permitting the derivation of the exact
distribution of coefficients.
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C.6 Statistical Inference
The functional relationship produced by supervised learning algorithms can be
used for inference (that is, to gain new insights into how the outcomes are gener-
ated) or for prediction (that is, to generate accurate outcome estimates, represented
by yˆ) for unknown or future inputs (x).
In the context of regression, inference looks to draw conclusions about the true
relationship of the population regression function (PRF) using the sample observa-
tions. This means running tests of hypothesis about the significance of the overall
relationship estimated by SRF, as well as testing for the significance of particular
coefficients. We also estimate confidence intervals for the estimated model.
An important component of statistical inference is a test statistic with a known
distribution. This assumes, under the null hypothesis, the estimated statistic is
similar to the true model; and computes the probability (given by the p-value) of
observing the value for this statistic in the sample. If the p-value drops below a
confidence threshold – usually five percent – we reject the null hypothesis.
In addition to GMT assumptions, we have the following distributional charac-
teristics for test statistic exactly when normality holds: The test statistic for a
hypothesis test given an individual coefficient βj is
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tj =
βˆj
σˆ
√
vj
∼ tN − p− 1 (24)
and follows a t distribution of N − p − 1 degrees of freedom, where vj is the jth
element of the diagonal of (xTx)−1.
C.7 AIC and BIC Goodness-of-Fit Measures
Alternative prominent goodness-of-fit measures are the Akaike Information Cri-
terion and (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The goal is to
minimise these based on the MLE:
• AIC = −2log(L∗) + 2k, where L∗ denotes the value of the maximised likeli-
hood function and k is the number of parameters
• BIC = 2log(L∗) + log(N)k, where N is the sample size
Given a collection of estimated models, AIC determines the quality of a model by
looking to find the model that best describes an unknown data-generating process;
whereas BIC aims to find the best model amongst a finite set of candidates. Both
provide a means of model selection. Each metric penalises for complexity. While
AIC has a lower penalty, thus might overfit; BIC imposes a larger penalty so it
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can underfit the data. In practice, AIC and BIC can be used jointly to guide
the process of model selection if the objective is to fit in-sample; otherwise, cross-
validation is preferable.
C.8 Hidden Orders
The LOBSTER data provides information on hidden LO executions – market event
of type 5. When reconstructing a MO that had been matched against several LOs
in the book, we often observe a MO initially execute against hidden LO, only
matching resting visible LOs at the best quote once it has consumed all hidden
liquidity. Although we do not particularly speak of the effect of hidden orders
in this text, it is important to understand that the response (effect) of some of
the visible MOs is affected by the hidden LOs at a better price. From the earlier
description of NASDAQ electronic exchange, we recall that orders are executed in
specific successions: orders with the best prices are matched first, priority being
given to the visible orders and the time of order submission. In other words, visible
orders are always executed first unless hidden LO has a better price. In such cases,
hidden orders (hidden liquidity) dilute the effect of aggressive MOs at the price
that matches the best in the LOB.
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C.9 Empirical Studies Review
In our implementation of price response algorithm we followed a number of promi-
nent (in the field of financial microstructure) research publications that worked
with LOBSTER data such as Bouchaud et al. (2018) and Gould et al. (2013).
Using the data for the same stocks, our results underestimate R (1) for all four
observed tickers: SIRI, EBAY, TSLA, PCLN. Since our findings report average
spread 〈s〉 exactly matching results of BBouchaud et al. (2018), we assume that
the discrepancy in the calculated values of response function R (1) arises from dif-
ferent approaches in dealing with a MO that matched a number of LOs in the LOB
(therefore appears as multiple entries at the same time-stamp in the LOBSTER
message file).
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DD.1 Future Work
D.1.1 Alternative Data
When giving a functional definition of market impact we have emphasised that in
this work we are looking specifically at the impact of individual market orders.
This is partially due to the specifics of LOBSTER data set that does not identify
meta-orders. However, as we later discovered, there are other free resources such
as NASDAQ OMX NORDIC (or just OMX) online database where one can ac-
cess trades and quotes data that identify market participants. This would enable
reconstruction of meta-orders and thus study of the latent liquidity.
Alternatively, as suggested by many similar empirical studies, having proprietary
data makes a big difference for accurate research of financial markets microstruc-
ture. Previous empirical studies of market impact employed traditional statis-
tical techniques with a few publications such as Nevmyvaka and Kearns (2016)
and Lehalle (2018) discussing application of ML methods. The majority of such
studies were conducted on clean academic historical datasets that often omit mi-
crostructure nuances required for a deeper level investigation. Contrastingly, we
seek collaboration with industry partners to support the vision of data driven re-
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search, by providing real-time proprietary microstructure data. This can be used
to simulate interesting game theory variations of agents behaviours in varying
market conditions.
D.1.2 Illiquid Markets
One of the main distinguishing properties of different markets is the availability and
visibility of liquidity. Moreover, liquidity can change drastically for an asset class
in times of stressed markets. Such events, characterised as black swan events, are
challenging to model since they appear as outliers in the data, making it difficult
for practitioners to decide on the most optimal actions when facing such scenarios.
The second motivation for this research is to investigate the key drivers affecting
liquidity dynamics, under stressed market conditions.
D.1.3 Invariant Market Impact Function
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2018), as well as, Eisler and Bouchaud (2016) have researched
into a universal solution for price impact. In their paper, “The Market Impact
Puzzle”, the former propose two conditions on the drivers of invariant formula
which result in the tightly parameterized function. Eisler and Bouchaud (2016)
have successfully applied the propagator technique to estimation of price impact
in OTC credit index market, with their quantitative results being similar to those
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in more traditional asset classes. Thus, confirming that price impact is a universal
phenomenon regardless of specifications of market microstructure.
D.1.4 Optimal Execution
Having a more comprehensive understanding of liquidity (ability to forecast liq-
uidity more accurately) is imperative to measuring market impact of trades, hence
associated transaction costs. This knowledge can help optimize a liquidation sched-
ule for large block orders. Studies of optimal trading strategies have often solely
focused on a single agent who desires to trade a certain amount of the security.
When generalised to multiple agents, the resulting stochastic optimal control prob-
lem is extremely difficult to solve. One approach is to investigate a mean field game
framework in which the interactions of major and minor players are approximated
by analysing how a finite subsample N , of the population of agents who seek to
adopt optimal game strategy, are restricted in their behaviour as N −→∞. Such
situations constitute Nash Equilibrium.
In this context, an area of machine learning called Reinforcement Learning (which
has roots in control theory) can be employed to solve the problem of optimised
trade execution. Reinforcement Learning (RL) attempts to learn a policy of how
to take actions in the environment in order to maximise the discounted future re-
ward criterion. The key advantage of Reinforcement Learning over other Machine
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Learning techniques, is that the agent learns directly how to make decisions, as
opposed to predicting target values. In the framework of our stochastic control
problem, the agent learns to optimize a trading path by dividing a specified order
across time, and venues with potentially different liquidity profiles.
To supplement the learning process, we will look to explore further applications of
Deep Neural Networks. As the agent accumulates the knowledge of which actions
yield the highest reward, this information is continuously stored to assist future
decision making ( trade-off between exploration and exploitation). However, as
the learning process continues this knowledge space can become extremely large
making it unfeasible for the algorithm to process (both mathematically and com-
putationally intractable for partially-observable/ stochastic environments). An
alternative to stowing all previously encountered states and their corresponding
best actions is to generalise past experiences by creating a neural network to pre-
dict the reward for a given input. This approach is more tractable than standard
knowledge storing techniques, allowing RL to be applied to more complex problems
where many network layers can capture the most intricate details, thus facilitating
deep learning.
To affirm the validity of our findings, a series of experiments will be carried out
using the scientific method. The work will be conducted in a controlled envi-
ronment with initial offline verification of assumptions on historical data sets.
Some properties of real time market dynamics, however, cannot be verified offline;
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therefore, should be validated at runtime. This might require high-performance
computational resources. The success of derived optimal trading behaviour will
be benchmark against traditional definitions of optimal execution such as arrival
price, VWAP and participation percentage.
D.1.5 Computational Resources
High frequency and detailed precision of LOBSTER data imply that the amount
of information about certain stocks’ trade activity easily exceeds several of Giga
Bites (GBs). Such a high volume of data is best dealt with using high-performance
computing resources that are optimised to improve on processing timings.
We strongly believe that the pace of learning from data can be majorly improved by
the usage of appropriate hardware designed for efficient analysis of large quantities
of information.
The below chart illustrates the average computational time for estimation of the
lag-1 unconditional impact of trades for four selected stocks. One of the challenges
of the current study was the long time it took to test the algorithm and collect
statistical information for further inference.
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Figure 18: Computational time in seconds for estimation of lag-1 unconditional
impact for 2nd of January to 30th of June 2015 in light grey; and the computational
time in seconds for estimation of lag-1 unconditional impact 30th of June to 31st
of December 2015 in dark grey
It is evident that even for less actively traded stocks such as SIRI and PCLN an
average running time of an algorithm that estimates lag-1 unconditional market
impact for 6 months is above 1000 seconds (the equivalent of 15 min). For a stock
that is traded heavily on NASDAQ, such as EBAY, estimation of the average
response function for half a year worth of data can easily take over an hour.
E
119
